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forfeiture statute. Under the Act, all water rights seekers needed to
apply for a permit and obtain a certificate. Since the forfeiture statute
applied to those permits, the court reasoned all permitted water rights,
including those for mining, were subject to the statute as well. Thus,
the court concluded the forfeiture statute also applied to the mining
water rights.
The Hannigans next argued that even if the statute applied, the
use of water at Parkerville during the relevant period should satisfy the
term "use" under the statute. The court determined "place of use" was
a component of "use" for the purposes of forfeiture because water
rights were appurtenant to specific parcels of land. The court further
reasoned the right to use water connected to the location of the perfection of the water right, the place named on the certificate. Additionally, the Department provided a procedure for water rights holders
to apply to change places of use, but the Hannigans failed to go
through that approval process. Accordingly, the court determined that
to avoid forfeiture under the statute, a holder must use water in the
place designated on the certificate. After finding substantial evidence
to support the Department's decision, the court affirmed the final
judgment of the Department canceling the Hannigans' water rights
due to of nonuse.
Story Washburn
WaterWatch, Inc. v. Water Res. Comm'n, 88 P.3d 327 (Or. Ct. App.
2004) (holding municipalities must adhere to the five-year construction requirements of Oregon's water law statute).
The Coos Bay North Bend Water Board ("CBNB") applied to the
Water Resources Department ("Department") in March 1990 for a
permit to appropriate water from Tenmile Creek. CBNB also submitted four water demand forecasts projecting growth and water needs
through 2050. The Department issued a proposed final order in December 1997 that approved the permit with conditions. WaterWatch
of Oregon, Inc. ("WaterWatch") filed protests claiming the water demand forecasts showed the CBNB included plans for water that would
not go into effect until 2050. The Oregon Water Resources Commission ("Commission") held a contested case proceeding and approved
the permit as well as the third forecast. The forecast predicted that by
2050, the CBNB needed 3 million gallons of water per day at a diversion rate of 4.6 cubic feet per second ("cfs") and included an additional 18.6 cfs for a potential industrial user. The Commission granted
the permit, allowing the CBNB to withdraw water at a maximum rate of
23.2 cfs. WaterWatch appealed to the Court of Appeals of Oregon to
contest the order.
The court first analyzed the issue of standing. Since the water law
statutes had more specific judicial review provisions than the general
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review provisions of Oregon's Administrative Procedures Act, the court
determined the water law statutes controlled. The pertinent statute
required the person or group is a party affected by a final order. WaterWatch filed a timely protest against the proposed order and, thus
satisfied met the statutory requirements to qualify as a party. To determine if WaterWatch was an affected party, the court looked at the
legislative intent and whom the proposed final order would positively
or negatively affect. The court determined three groups of persons
that could be parties to a contested case proceeding: the applicant; a
person who requested standing or supported the proposed final order;
and a person who protested the proposed final order. In its protest,
WaterWatch indicated it represented the public and included how the
proposed final order adversely affected its interests in instream rights
of Tenmile Creek. The court ruled that because WaterWatch included
specifics in its protest, including time, money, and effort spent to create an instream water right in Tenmile Creek, and because the permit
would affect this right, WaterWatch demonstrated standing.
In addition to standing, WaterWatch needed to demonstrate it satisfied constitutional justiciability requirements by showing the Commission's decision would practically affect its rights. In its protest, WaterWatch explained the CBNB would have an earlier priority date than
any instream right, making any instream rights subject to CBNB's use.
This later priority would significantly diminish WaterWatch's investment in the instream rights in Tenmile Creek. WaterWatch also provided several affidavits from its own members to show that the issuance
of the permit detrimentally affected their own use and enjoyment. For
these reasons, the court concluded WaterWatch satisfied the justiciability requirements.
To defeat the proposed final order, the court stated the record
must show CBNB's plan violated one or more of the criteria in the water law statute or the proposed use would be detrimental to the public
interest. The statute set a timeline for the perfection of a water right
that required actual construction begin within one year from the date
of the application approval, the construction shall be pursued with due
diligence and completed within a reasonable time, and that time shall
not exceed five years. There was an exception to the five year limitation: for good cause shown or if governmental requirements relating to
the project significantly delayed completion. The Commission described CBNB's plan and determined that the earliest date for perfection of the right was 2025. The Commission approved this plan based
on the CBNB proceeding with due diligence. The court rejected this
argument because the statute imposes a five-year limit on due diligence
by requiring construction to finish in five years.
The CBNB argued that applications for municipal uses should receive special consideration due to the significant and substantial differences from other uses. Therefore, the five-year limit was only a
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guideline. The court disagreed, stating the Oregon's water law required that water was appropriated for beneficial use in a timely manner. The text of the statute exempted municipal uses from the one
year start time, but applied the five year limit to all diversions. The
court found no municipal exemption for the completion requirement
existed in the statute. The CBNB argued it could get an extension for
good cause shown, however, the text stated extensions only apply after
the issuance of a permit and after delays occur. The CBNB also argued
if it was in the public interest for CBNB to obtain the permit for municipal use, the permit should be issued regardless of the statutory
terms. The court held that because the statute did not allow for this,
the five year restriction still applied.
For the reasons above, the court concluded the CBNB could not
exercise due diligence in the construction of the diversion and that the
Commission erred as a matter of law. The court reversed the Commission's decision and remanded to the Commission for further proceedings.
Kathleen Booth

SOUTH CAROLINA
Lucas v. Rawl Family Ltd., 598 S.E.2d 712 (S.C. 2004) (holding the
common enemy rule applies regardless of a landowner's intent to
cause a nuisance to an adjacent, lower landowner's property).
Franklin Lucas brought action against adjacent landowner Rawl
Family Limited Partnership ("Rawl") in the Lexington County Court
for negligence, trespass, and nuisance. Lucas sought damages for repeated flooding to his land that resulted after Rawl cut down trees and
removed stumps from forty acres of the land in order to prepare the
land for farming. Rawl's land sat at a higher elevation than Lucas'
land. Water naturally flowed from Rawl's land onto Lucas' land. After
Rawl cleared the land, Lucas' land flooded after every heavy rain, preventing Lucas from growing crops.
The trial court granted Rawl a directed verdict for negligence, but
allowed the jury to consider the trespass and nuisance claims. The jury
rejected the trespass claim, but awarded damages to Lucas for nuisance. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the
trial court should have entered a directed verdict for Rawl on the nuisance claim because the common enemy rule did not apply. The court
of appeals found that the common enemy rule only applied when
landowners take "direct action" regarding surface water on their properties that obstruct or alter natural flow and, as a result, harm adjoining landowners. Rawl had no intent to influence the natural flow of
the surface water because Rawl cleared the land only in preparation for
farming, not to alter the flow of surface water. Thus, the court of ap-

